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1. INTRODUCTION 
The Russian Federation inherited a confusing and inefficient tax system after the 
breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991. However since then, the Russian tax system has 
been significantly reformed. In the 1990s, businesses and individuals were generally 
reluctant to pay taxes promptly, if at all.
1
 The restructuring of the tax system was 
designed to rationalise the tax burden, improve the collection of taxes, and to 
generally align the system with those in developed market economies.  
There are three levels of taxation in Russia: federal, regional and local.  Major tax 
reform commenced in 1999 and resulted in a reduction of the number of official taxes 
from over 200 to approximately 40, in addition to setting out the administrative 
framework for the new system.
2
 Currently, the principal taxes collected at the federal 
level are corporate tax (20% on worldwide income),
3
 capital gains tax,
4
 personal 
income tax (13% flat tax),
5
 social contribution taxes,
6
 value added tax (VAT) 
(standard rate 18%),
7
 excise taxes, securities tax (0.8% on nominal value), customs 
duties and fees, and federal license fees. The tax administration has constantly been 
improved which, in recent years, has resulted in tax revenue growth at almost 30 
percent annually.
8
  
 
                                                 
* Lecturer, University of Technology Sydney.  E-mail: evgenygug@gmail.com 
1  For example, in 1996, 26 tax collectors were killed, six were kidnapped, and 41 had their homes burned 
down. In the first half of 1997, the government only collected 57% of its targeted tax revenues. 
Sodnomova S. K. 2008. Theory and history of taxation. Irkutsk: Publishing BGUEP. 
2  Panskov V. G. 2006. Tax and tax system of the Russian Federation. Moscow, Book World 
3  From 1 January 2009, 2% of this rate is paid to the federal budget and 18% to the regional budgets 
(previously, the federal portion was 6.5%). 
4  There is no separate capital gains tax in Russia. Capital gains are taxable as normal business income. 
5  Income tax rate for non-residents is 30% (flat rate). 
6  Social contribution are payable in connection with employee salaries by employers to the state pension, 
medical insurance and social insurance funds (34 % starting on January 1, 2011). 
7  A 10% VAT rate is applied to food products, children’s goods, and printed materials, such as 
schoolbooks. 
8  Rosstat (Russian federal service of government statistics). Available at: 
  http://www.gks.ru/wps/wcm/connect/rosstat/rosstatsite/main/finance/ 
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In the international context, the Russian tax code provides double taxation relief by 
way of a tax credit for foreign taxes paid on foreign sourced income, subject to a limit 
equivalent to the maximum sum of Russian tax payable on the same income. Any 
excess foreign tax credits may not be transferred to future or previous periods. Russia 
is also a party to a number of double taxation agreements (DTA) with various 
countries.  In general terms, it is rather unproblematic to repatriate capital (particularly 
dividends, interests and royalties) from Russia to other countries. Similarly, it is 
relatively simple to invest in the Russian economy through low-tax countries (or tax 
havens – also referred to as ‘offshore zones’ in Russia) and international holding, 
financial, licensing and service companies and banks.
9
 The largest part of foreign 
direct investment (FDI) inflow comes from countries which have favourable tax 
treaties with Russia. Popular locations of offshore companies utilised when 
conducting international business with Russia include Cyprus, Holland, Switzerland, 
Luxembourg and the British Virgin Islands. However, the Russian government is 
currently attempting to tighten the tax law and in this vein, has been updating 
international tax law and the existing DTA network.  
2. DOUBLE TAX AGREEMENTS 
From 1970 until 1991, the USSR developed a DTA network including DTAs with 
India, Finland, Malaysia, the Netherlands, Denmark, Japan, France, the UK, Canada, 
Spain, Italy, Cyprus, Germany, Sweden, Austria and the USA.
10
 However, since there 
were (almost) no cross-border private businesses, the application of these treaties was 
relatively low. After the Soviet era, Russia became party to a number of DTAs, and 
has continued to extend its DTA network vigorously since then.
11
  For example, in 
1997, Russia had DTAs with 37 countries (including those inherited from the 
USSR),
12
 and by 2010, had increased this number to 77. 
13
  This includes DTAs with 
most European countries, Australia, China, the USA, Canada, Japan, India, and other 
countries important economically and politically.
14
 
With some deviations, the treaties of the USSR resembled the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) or United Nations (UN) model tax 
treaties of the time.
15
 The tax treaties to which the former USSR was a party are 
honoured by Russia, unless the other party to the treaty has rejected it. The Russian 
Tax Treaty Model (RTTM) was accepted in 1992 and in general follows the OECD 
model of that time.
16
 By and large, with some exceptions, Russian DTAs have been 
based on the updated OECD model. This approach corresponds to the general route of 
the country to join main international economic organisations, including the OECD. It 
is essential to emphasise that DTAs concluded by Russia with other jurisdictions are 
an integral part of domestic tax legislation. Russian tax law clearly indicates that if a 
                                                 
9  Zhidkova E. Y. 2009. Taxes and taxation. Moscow. Eksmo. 
10 Sodnomova S. K. 2008, above n 1. 
11 Panskov V. G. 2006, above n 2. 
12  International Conventions of Russia. Available at: http://www.taxpravo.ru/zakonodatelstvo/90278-int 
13 Panskov V. G. 2006, above n 2. 
14 International Conventions of Russia, above n 12. 
15 Sodnomova S. K. 2008, above n 1. 
16  Resolution of the Government of the Russian Federation of 28 May 1992, No. 354, “On Conclusion of 
Inter-Government Tax Treaties on Avoidance of Double Taxation of Income and Capital”. 
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DTA provides other regulations than the law itself, the regulations of the DTA will 
prevail.
17
 Hence, it is of no surprise that tax treaties significantly influence Russian 
domestic tax law and fiscal authorities frequently rely on DTA provisions.  
2.1 Residency 
The relatively large number of DTAs concluded has forced the Russian fiscal 
authorities to embark upon the problems connected with the application of some their 
provisions. One of the major issues in the international taxation context relates to 
concept of residency. The key criterion of fiscal residency (for corporations) in Russia 
is the place of incorporation. The notion of a Russian/non-Russian tax resident for 
corporate tax purposes is at present not defined under domestic tax law.  Despite the 
lack of definition, Russian tax law does distinguish between domestic and foreign 
enterprises. Domestic enterprises are those which are established under the laws of 
Russia and are taxed on their worldwide income. Foreign enterprises controlled and 
managed in Russia are subject to tax on profits derived from business activities carried 
on through a permanent establishment in the Russian Federation. Despite the fact that 
Russia is not an OECD member state, the definition of permanent establishment under 
Russian domestic law
18
 broadly follows the permanent establishment concept provided 
in the OECD Model Convention. Generally, foreign companies may have certain 
advantages in conducting business activities in Russia through a permanent 
establishment. Contrary to a Russian company, after-tax profit distributions from a 
permanent establishment to the head office of a foreign company are not subject to 
dividend withholding tax.
19
 Further, currently Russian “thin capitalisation rules” apply 
to resident borrowers only. This makes a permanent establishment an attractive form 
of business structure to enter the Russian market.  
When determining profit attribution to a permanent establishment, the domestic tax 
code stipulates the indirect profit allocation method as a general rule. However, the 
majority of Russian DTAs use the direct profit allocation method. ‘Force of 
attraction’
20
 clauses are present in a small number of tax treaties (with Indonesia, 
Kazakhstan, the Philippines, and Vietnam) but lacking in treaties with key investment 
and trade partners (the US, the UK, Cyprus, France, Germany, and the Netherlands). 
As noted above, international treaties prevail over the domestic law. For that reason, if 
a permanent establishment of a foreign enterprise utilises the direct profit allocation 
method, it cannot be forced to use the indirect method unless a relevant DTA 
stipulates the use of the indirect method.  
Notwithstanding the Tax Code allowing the application of the indirect method, the 
Russian Tax Ministry recommendation
21
 stated that the attribution of a foreign 
enterprise’s profits to its Russian permanent establishment shall be founded on the 
relevant principles in DTAs.  That is, the permanent establishment’s profit is 
                                                 
17 Russian Tax Code, Article 7. Available at: http://www.info-law.ru/kodeks/12/ 
18 Russian Tax Code, Article 306. Available at: http://www.info-law.ru/kodeks/12/ 
19 Polezharova L., A Permanent Establishment of A Foreign Company, Russian Tax Courier, May 2003. 
20 Generally, ‘force of attraction clause’ implies that one State may tax the business profits arising to a 
resident of the other State by virtue of a PE in the first state or otherwise. 
21 Order of the Tax Ministry, No. BG-3-23/150, of 28 March 2003 “On Approval of the Methodological 
Recommendations for Tax Authorities on the Application of Certain Provisions of Chapter 25 of the 
Tax Code of the Russian Federation Taxation of Foreign Organisations”. 
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considered to be a profit made by a separate and independent enterprise.  This 
resemblance between domestic law and the OECD Model illustrates that tax treaties 
have served as a conduit and influenced the development of Russian domestic tax law 
on the matter. This situation represented the first time a DTA principle has been 
officially recognised in domestic law.  As a result, this DTA principle is now applied 
regardless of whether there is a DTA in existence.  
2.2 Beneficial ownership 
Recently, the Russian fiscal authorities have started focusing on tax avoidance issues 
involving the use of DTAs. One of the major issue in this context is treaty shopping. 
The notion of treaty shopping may be defined as an activity where a resident of a third 
country seeks to gain the benefit of a DTA between two other countries by 
establishing an entity in one of the countries that is a party of the DTA. Importantly, 
the unique difference between a ‘treaty shopper’ and an ordinary business is that in the 
instance of treaty shopping, economic ties linking the taxpayer and the treaty state are 
inadequate. In other words, the treaty shopper’s occurrence in the treaty country lacks 
economic substance.  
Clearly, treaty shopping is considered offensive to the spirit of tax law.  As a result, a 
number of measures have been developed in international tax law to avert or reduce 
treaty shopping practices. The beneficial ownership concept is one such mechanism. 
Fundamentally, the beneficial ownership concept requires taxpayers to demonstrate 
genuine economic control over the income received so as to obtain the benefits under 
the DTA.  The beneficial ownership mechanism mostly affects passive income, that is, 
dividends, interest and royalties.  
Most Russian DTAs, as noted above, follow the OECD Model, and thus include the 
beneficial ownership concept. Nonetheless, the concept is rarely applied in practice, 
even though many Russian businesses utilise low-tax jurisdictions to reinvest their 
capital in Russia. Sporadically, Russian fiscal authorities have attempted to apply the 
beneficial ownership concept, but the impact on the business activities of both Russian 
and foreign investors were rather limited.
22
 Recently however, the Russian President 
ordered the government to develop measures counteracting treaty abuse. Following 
this order, the Finance Ministry proposed amendments to Article 7 of the Russian Tax 
Code concerning eligibility for treaty benefits.
23
 Specifically, under the proposed 
amendments, the beneficial owner of certain Russian source income must be 
determined in order to receive benefits under a DTA. Formally, these amendments 
aimed to structure the legislative mechanisms necessary to counteract the exploitation 
of DTAs by the final beneficiary which is not a resident of either of the countries that 
is a party of the DTA. The amendments to Article 7 would essentially introduce the 
concept of beneficial ownership to Russian domestic law. However, the proposed 
provisions do not specify the criteria and mechanism to identify a foreign company as 
the beneficial owner.
24
  
                                                 
22 Zhidkova E. Y. 2009, above n 9. 
23 The draft federal law "On Amending Part I of the RTC for Counteracting Treaty Shopping when 
Carrying out Operations with Foreign Companies and Individuals" prepared by the Russian Ministry of 
Finance, in accordance with paragraph 39 of the Russian President’s Budget message 2009. 
24 Ibid. 
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As noted above, a number of DTAs concluded by the Russian Federation include 
requirements to apply preferential withholding tax rates to dividend, interest and 
royalty payments only if they are being paid to the actual beneficial owners (see for 
example, the payment of dividends under the Russia – Cyprus DTA). However, the 
treaties do not specify a mechanism to facilitate the identification of the actual 
beneficial owner of certain income. Therefore, the proposed amendments to Article 7 
of the Russian Tax Code would not solve the problem. Some jurisdictions adopt a 
mechanism and specific criteria in domestic law for identifying beneficial ownership 
status. For example, in the US, the beneficial ownership test is rather extensive: 
questionnaires must be completed and information provided on the foreign income 
beneficiary. The Russian tax authority is likely to apply the OECD approach, 
suggesting that a company cannot be regarded as the beneficial owner if it acts as an 
agent, nominee or a ‘conduit’ company for another person, who is the actual recipient 
of the benefit.
25
 However, OECD principles are not mandatory in Russia which could 
easily lead to ambiguous interpretation of the amendments to Article 7. 
The Russian fiscal authorities are also likely to experience difficulty obtaining 
information on the identity of the ultimate beneficiary of dividends, interest and 
royalties. Hence, the proposed amendments would be of limited assistance to the 
Russian government in combating tax avoidance and treaty shopping.  Instead, the 
Russian government should introduce an explicit regulation specifying the beneficial 
ownership test. This regulation should not be subject to the discretion of the tax 
authorities. However, even if the current proposal is significantly improved in Russia, 
it may take more than one amendment to create the necessary legislative structure. As 
at November 2011, the amendments to Article 7 of the Tax Code have not been 
submitted to the State Duma (Russian Parliament), and it is therefore unclear when the 
draft law will be enacted. For the time being, the Russian fiscal authorities have to rely 
on tax treaties to counteract treaty shopping. 
3.0 TAX AVOIDANCE AND DTAS  
In many OECD countries, fiscal consolidation practices, controlled foreign 
corporation (CFC) rules and transfer pricing legislation all aim to restrain the use of 
offshore international financial centres (OIFCs). Generally, these mechanisms 
counteract tax avoidance practices such as retaining untaxed profits in the taxpayer’s 
foreign subsidiaries, pricing international sales in an attempt to maximise profits in 
low-tax countries, and mixing foreign profits and losses in the taxpayer’s home 
jurisdiction to reduce tax payments. Such anti-avoidance mechanisms are immature in 
Russia.   For example, there are no general anti-avoidance provisions in Russian tax 
law.  Further, there are no CFC rules, tax consolidation is restricted to very limited 
circumstances and the transfer pricing regulations are ineffective, although new 
regulations may be introduced in 2011-2012.
26
  Russian courts have attempted to 
                                                 
25 OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and Capital 2010, Commentary to Article 10/12 and Art. 
11/4. 
26 In 2010 the Russian Ministry of Finance proposed a draft law on transfer pricing. The key amendments 
include the introduction of: 1) an "arm's length" concept (the existing rules are based on more than a 20 
% deviation from market prices); 2) "functional analysis" as a key method for definng which 
transactions are relevant for comparison purposes; 3) the option of "advance pricing agreements" with 
the tax authorities, to avoid disputes and increase certainty and some other important amendments. 
Additionally, a consolidated group treatment is proposed to allow corporate groups to consolidate 
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combat tax avoidance through the development of the so-called ‘unjustified tax 
benefit’
27
 concept.  However, there are no structured administrative or legal 
regulations concerning the application of this concept and other anti-avoidance 
provisions to tax treaties.  
As already mentioned, Russian investors often utilise OIFC companies for business 
activities in Russia or abroad. Normally, foreign asset income will be locally taxed but 
profits collected by the OIFC company may linger untaxed as a result of the lack of 
CFC regulations, given that they are not repatriated to Russia. Similarly, the indulgent 
Russian transfer pricing rules permit a large amount of the profit inbuilt in the 
imported goods to be collected by an intermediate OIFC company. Furthermore, if a 
Russian investor reinvests capital to Russia
28
 through an intermediary company in one 
of the OIFCs that has a favourable DTA with Russia, the remittance of Russian 
profits, royalties or interest will be taxed at a minimum level. It is not surprising then, 
that in the 1990s many Russian banks set up branches in Cyprus, in support of 
schemes to expatriate Russian capital and profits. Subsequently, the Netherlands, 
Luxemburg, Malta and Gibraltar became popular for the same reasons.
29
 Nowadays, 
Russian holding companies are established in a wide range of OIFCs.  
An investor from one of the countries that has a DTA with Russia may invest directly 
in Russia, and rely on the DTA to diminish Russian withholding taxes on dividends, 
interest or royalties. Typically, withholding tax rates are in the range of five to 15 
percent on dividends, and zero to ten percent on interest or royalties. Examples of 
OIFC countries that have DTAs with Russia include Cyprus and Luxembourg.  Under 
the Russian-Cyprus DTA, the rate of withholding tax on dividends is five percent if 
the investment was greater than US$100,000 and ten percent if not, whereas the rates 
for interest and royalty payments are zero.
30
 Under the Russia-Luxemburg DTA, the 
rate of withholding tax on dividends is ten percent for a greater than 30 percent 
ownership of the company paying the dividend, and 15 percent in all other cases.  The 
withholding tax rates on interest and royalty payments is zero. Generally, Cyprus and 
Luxembourg are not high tax jurisdictions. Moreover, if a non-resident is a beneficial 
owner of the holding company he is not taxed at all in these countries. Thus, it is no 
surprise that Cyprus appears to be a very popular place to establish a holding company 
for Russian businesses. 
                                                 
profits and losses earned by different subsidiaries. For the detailed discussion see: Variychuk, E. 2011. 
Russia – In Search of Effective Regulation: Draft Bill on Transfer Pricing. Bulletin for International 
Taxation Vol. 65 (2). 
27 The ‘unjustified tax benefit’ concept means that tax benefits (tax deductions, tax refunds or lower tax 
rates) may be rejected if application of those benefits is the only or one of the main reasons of the 
activities of a taxpayer. 
28 At present, many Russian companies reinvest capital to Russia. 
29 For example, only in January and Februrary of  2011, a net outflow of capital from Russia amounted to 
US$ 17 billion. Vedomosti, 16 March 2011. Available at:  
 http://www.vedomosti.ru/finance/news/1232209/iz_rossii_prodolzhaet_utekat_kapital 
30 Agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the Republic of 
Cyprus from 05.12.1998 on “The Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on Income and 
on Capital” Available at:  
 http://www.taxpravo.ru/zakonodatelstvo/statya-90420-
soglashenie_mejdu_pravitelstvom_rf_i_pravitelstvom_respubliki_kipr_ot_05121998 
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As noted above, the Russian government is attempting to update domestic tax law to 
counteract tax avoidance.  Also, more anti-abuse provisions have been included in the 
more recent Russian tax treaties.  Such provisions can be seen in the Russia-Cyprus 
DTA, and it is therefore worth discussing this treaty in greater detail.   
3.1 Russia-Cyprus DTA 
The DTA between Russia and Cyprus was signed in 1998.
31
 This DTA was one of the 
major causes of the massive flow of Russian investment through the Mediterranean 
island in the past two decades. Cyprus is a leader in terms of investments in Russia. At 
the peak of investment in 2008, Cyprus’ investments in Russia reached US$56.9 
billion.
32
 This represents more than 20% of all foreign investments in Russia.
33
  Most 
of these investments, however, are repatriated Russian capital.  
The Cyprus Government was successful in building a favourable offshore tax regime, 
with nearly 50,000 offshore companies being registered in Cyprus since 1975.
34
 
Nevertheless, in 2004, Cyprus joined the European Union (EU) which signified a 
reform of their tax regime.  Cyprus has the lowest corporate tax in the EU, with 
resident companies paying ten percent tax.  (This is similar to non-resident companies, 
but income from foreign sources is exempt for non-residents).
35
 Interestingly, Cyprus 
has signed DTAs with many OECD states (around 50 in total) including major high-
tax countries.
36
 This is unusual for an offshore financial centre and distinguishes 
Cyprus as a convenient place for establishing holding and investment companies 
intended for developing markets.  
Many large Russian businesses utilise Cyprus holding companies in some way.
37
 For 
example, Aleksei Mordashov controls Severstal
38
 through the Cyprus company 
Frontdeal Ltd. Another Russian oligarch, Viktor Rashnikov, holds 87 percent of the 
shares of MMK
39
 through two Cyprus companies – Mintha Holding Ltd and Fulnek 
Enterprises Ltd. Realising that businesses often use Cyprus companies in tax 
structuring arrangements, the Russian government added Cyprus to a ‘blacklist’ in 
2008, on the basis that it was an ‘uncooperative territory’. The black list was 
introduced through an amendment to the Russian tax code.
40
 It provides a tax 
                                                 
31 Ibid. 
32 Rosstat (Russian federal service of government statistics)  
 http://www.gks.ru/wps/wcm/connect/rosstat/rosstatsite/main/enterprise/investment/foreign/index.html 
33 Ibid. 
34 Cyprus Company Formation. Available at:  
http://www.ukincorp.co.uk/s-O8-offshore-cyprus-company-formation.html 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Zaharov A. 2009. How Cyprus will exchange of tax information? Available at: 
 http://www.taxpravo.ru/analitika/statya-72030-kak_kipr_budet_obmenivatsya_nalogovoy_informatsiey 
38 Sverstal is a Russian steel and mining company. As of 2009, it is the largest steel company in Russia 
according to the Metal Bulletin. Severstal revenue in 2009 was US$ 13.01 billion. 
39 MMK is abbreviation for Magnitogorsk Iron and Steel Works company. MMK produced 21.8 million 
tonns of steel and steel products in 2010. MMK revenue in 2009 was US$ 5.081 billion. 
40 The list was published on June 18, 2007 and included 59 jurisdictions, such as the offshore Caymans, 
Maldives, British Virgin Islands and others countries. Similar list was earlier issued by the Bank of 
Russia (Directive 1317-Y of the Bank of Russia of August 7, 2003). 
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exemption on the repatriation of dividends from foreign subsidiaries of Russian 
businesses, but excludes Russian subsidiaries founded in countries on the blacklist. 
Some countries, (for example, Ireland, Luxembourg and Switzerland), lobbied the 
Russian government and were excluded from the blacklist.
41
 However, Cyprus 
continually failed to provide information to the Russian tax authorities and thus has 
stayed on the blacklist.  
In April 2009, Russia and Cyprus initiated a revision of double taxation treaty, with 
the amending protocol to the Russia-Cyprus DTA
42
 signed during a visit to Cyprus by 
Russian President Dmitry Medvedev in October 2010. The Russian President 
suggested that the new protocol would provide business transparency and confirmed 
that Cyprus would be removed from the Russian blacklist. The importance of this 
DTA for Russia necessitates exploring the treaty amendments to identify its major 
developments. 
3.1.1 Amendments to the Russia – Cyprus DTA 
The new protocol to the Russia-Cyprus DTA is intimately in line with the latest 
version of the OECD Model and commentaries thereto. Several protocol provisions 
are especially significant for the development of the Russian international tax regime. 
One of the key developments is that the term ‘permanent establishment’ (Article 5) 
was further clarified in the protocol to the DTA.
43
 The term was extended by including 
the following supplementary conditions: 
 provision of services through an individual, if such individual is present in Russia for 
more than 183 days during any 12-month period, and income from such services 
constitutes more than 50% of the Cyprus company’s income from active business 
activities during the relevant period; or 
 provision of services, in respect of one or connected projects, through one or more 
individuals, for a period exceeding 183 days (in aggregate) during any 12-month 
period.
44
 
The Russian fiscal authorities, like many other countries, want to increase their 
revenues. However, instead of increasing the tax base of Russian companies that pay 
management fees to Cypriot companies, the protocol redefines fees earned by Cypriot 
companies for the provision of management services as Russian sourced income. 
According to the protocol, a Cypriot company cannot provide management services if 
they lack the presence of representatives in Russia. Hence, a Cypriot company 
providing management services and charging the relevant fees to a Russian company 
is considered to have a representative in Russia, and thus having a permanent 
establishment in Russia. In other words, the protocol specifies that the provision of 
                                                 
41 Zhidkova E. Y. 2009, above n 9. 
42 Protocol to the Agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of 
the Republic of Cyprus on the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on Income and on 
Capital Available at: 
 http://www.taxpravo.ru/zakonodatelstvo/statya-90417-
protokol_k_soglasheniyu_mejdu_pravitelstvom_rossiyskoy_federatsii_i_pravitelstvom_respubliki 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid. 
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management services gives rise to a permanent establishment in Russia. This is a 
novel provision for Russian DTAs, and implemented specifically to increase 
permanent establishment exposure. Additionally, the 183 days test relates specifically 
to presence and not provision of services, meaning the provision of services for less 
than 183 days may be sufficient to create a permanent establishment. However, it is 
surprising that the wording of the protocol does not cover Cyprus companies with 
managers based in Russia. 
Another important amendment to the Russia – Cyprus DTA concerns the taxation of 
income from immovable property (Article 6).
45
 Tax structuring has frequently 
involved utilising mutual funds for property investments.
46
 Article 10 of the DTA has 
been amended, and provides that payments on shares of ‘mutual funds or similar 
forms of collective investment’
47
 shall be treated as dividends and, consequently, are 
subject to either five or 10 percent Russian withholding tax. The amendments to 
Article 6 specify that income of mutual funds ‘investing only in immovable property’ 
shall be treated as income from immovable property and, as a result, subject to 20% 
Russian withholding tax. Apparently, the intention of the Russian fiscal authorities is 
to characterise such income as income derived from immovable property. In this case, 
Article 6 rather than Article 10 is applied and income distributed by Russian real 
estate mutual funds to Cypriot investors is subject to 20% withholding tax in Russia. 
Nonetheless, the protocol does not provide clear definitions of mutual funds or similar 
forms of collective investment and whether income from Russian real estate mutual 
funds will fall within the scope of income from immovable property.
48
 Thus, the scope 
of these amendments will need to be further clarified by the fiscal authorities of the 
DTA parties. 
The amendment to the taxation of income from international traffic (Article 8) 
corresponds to that in the OECD Model Tax Convention. Under the previous version 
of the DTA, income from international traffic (by ships, aircrafts or road vehicles in 
certain circumstances) was exempt from Russian withholding tax if the recipient was a 
resident in Cyprus. The Amended version of the DTA stipulates that the recipient of 
such income is exempt only if they have their place of effective management in 
Cyprus.
49
 
The protocol has also broadened the definitions of dividends (Article 10) and interest 
(Article 11). The dividend taxation regime has been extended to: 
 income from depositary receipts (though it is not clear if this means income 
received by the nominee holder of shares or income received by the beneficial 
owners of shares); 
 any payments on shares of mutual investment funds or similar collective 
investment vehicles, and 
                                                 
45 Ibid. 
46 Zaharov A. 2009, above n 37. 
47 Protocol to the Russia-Cyprus DTA, above n 42. 
48 Protocol to the Russia-Cyprus DTA, above n 42. 
49 Protocol to the Russia-Cyprus DTA, above n 42. 
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 interest which, in accordance with domestic laws of the source State, is treated 
as dividends.
50
 
The new amendments imply that income from mutual funds or similar investment 
vehicles will be deemed to be dividends (with the exception of income from such 
mutual funds investing only in immovable property as discussed above). This 
amendment also clarifies the question as to whether interest deemed as dividends 
under Russian tax law should still qualify as interest under the DTA or whether the 
treaty should follow the domestic law characterisation.
51
 However, it is not clear 
whether other Russian DTAs will be amended to overcome the above ambiguity. 
Further, interest income would continue to enjoy an exemption from withholding tax. 
However, this exemption does not apply to interest which constitutes a constructive 
dividend under Russian thin capitalisation rules.
52
 The definition of interest has been 
extended to embrace interest on profit-participating loans, premiums and prises 
associated with government securities, bonds and debentures. Nevertheless, penalty 
charges for late payment are not included in the definition of interest and are therefore 
likely to be considered as ‘business profits’ or ‘other income’. 
A further significant amendment relates to the taxation of gains from the alienation of 
property (Article 13).
53
 Specifically, the rules on the taxation of capital gains were 
modified in accordance with the OECD Model Tax Convention. According to the 
protocol, income from the alienation of shares deriving more than 50 precent of their 
value from Russian real estate is subject to 20 percent Russian withholding tax. 
However, in the following three cases, there is an exemption from Russian 
withholding tax: 
 alienation of shares in the course of corporate reorganisation; 
 alienation of shares listed on a recognised stock exchange; and 
 alienation of shares by a pension fund, a provident fund or the government of 
Cyprus.
54
 
A similar provision for the alienation of shares exists in the Russian Tax Code.
55
 
However, that provision does not specify the mechanism of paying withholding tax for 
a non-resident company that is lacking a presence in Russia. Further, the provision 
does not cover the indirect possession of Russian immovable property through a chain 
of Russian or Cypriot companies. It also excludes the alienation of interests in a 
Cypriot business holding more than 50 percent of immovable property assets in Russia 
and owned through a branch. As a result, this amendment appears to focus on direct 
                                                 
50 Protocol to the Russia-Cyprus DTA, above n 42. 
51 This approach was confirmed by Russian arbitration court in the cases involving the tax treaties with 
Germany and the Netherlands. See Decision of the North-Western Federal District Arbitration Court 
No. А 6-19 78/2006 of 9 April 2007 and Decision of the Moscow Federal District Arbitration Court No. 
KA-A 0/6616-0 of 2 July 2005. 
52 Russian Tax Code. Article 269(2). Available at: http://www.info-law.ru/kodeks/12/ 
53 According to the previous version of Article 13 of the DTA, income of Cyprus companies from the sale 
of shares in Russian companies is exempt from Russian tax. 
54 Protocol to the Russia-Cyprus DTA, above n 42. 
55 Russian Tax Code. Article 214 (1). Available at: http://www.info-law.ru/kodeks/12/ 
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real estate ownership structures only and is unlikely to affect indirect holdings. These 
loopholes may be addressed in the future, considering that this provision will not come 
into effect until January 1, 2014 at the earliest. This delay is intended to allow Russia 
to adjust its current DTAs with other countries. 
Other amendments to the Russia-Cyprus DTA that are worthy of discussion include 
Articles relating to mutual agreement, exchange of information, and reciprocal 
assistance. According to Article 4 of the, the resident status of a company is to be 
defined by its place of management (the tax residency criterion in Cyprus) or place of 
registration (the tax residency criterion in Russia).
56
  Thus, if the company is a tax 
resident of both States, the place of effective management is a key factor to determine 
residency.  The protocol has introduced a mutual agreement procedure (Article 25) in 
the case that the place of effective management cannot be determined.
57
  However, it 
appears that the protocol wording does not specify the mutual agreement procedure for 
a situation where one state questions whether the place of effective management was 
the other state. The introduction of a mutual agreement procedure is still a positive 
development, as taxpayers are now allowed to present their case to the fiscal authority 
of either State within three years if they believe that a state is in breach of the DTA.
58 
The previous version of the DTA permitted a taxpayer to apply only to the fiscal 
authority of the state where he was a resident. 
Another key provision of the DTA is the exchange of information article (Article 
26).
59
 Article 26 uses the identical wording as the OECD Model Tax Convention. 
Similar amendments were also introduced to Russia’s DTAs with the Czech Republic 
and Germany (in effect from 1 January 2010).
60
 
Specifically, the adjustments to the provision on exchange of information are: 
 information exchanges are no longer limited to taxes covered by the DTA; 
 information requests are permitted where it is ‘necessary for carrying out the 
provisions of the agreement’, and also where it is ‘foreseeably relevant’ for 
the ‘administration and enforcement of domestic laws’; 
 information requests would need to be processed, even where the requested 
information is held by a bank, nominee or a person acting in an agency or 
fiduciary capacity or relates to the identity of the owners of the company.
61
 
The revised provision broadens the scope of information that can be requested. In 
particular, either State may request information concerning taxes not only covered by 
the DTA (as provided in the previous DTA) but also information concerning domestic 
taxes. A state is obligated to provide information even though it ‘may not need such 
information for its own tax purposes’.
62
 These amendments demonstrate the increasing 
                                                 
56 Protocol to the Russia-Cyprus DTA, above n 42. 
57 Protocol to the Russia-Cyprus DTA, above n 42. 
58 Protocol to the Russia-Cyprus DTA, above n 42. 
59 Protocol to the Russia-Cyprus DTA, above n 42. 
60 These DTAs are available at: http://www.taxpravo.ru/zakonodatelstvo/90278-int 
61 Protocol to the Russia-Cyprus DTA, above n 42. 
62 Protocol to the Russia-Cyprus DTA, above n 42. 
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attention of the Russian fiscal authorities to the factual substance of Cypriot 
companies. Some commentators suggest that the basis for this exchange of 
information was the newly revised legislation of Cyprus, including the law ‘On the 
Assessment and Collection of Taxes’.
63
 The new Article 26 also provides that both 
States should follow procedures of collecting information in accordance with their 
domestic laws. According to the Cypriot Law the Director of the Inland Revenue 
should provide information to the other State only if foreign fiscal authorities have 
provided extensive details about the taxpayer along with the justification for the 
request of information.
64
 This clause exists to prevent foreign fiscal authorities from 
engaging in ‘fishing expeditions’ lacking any genuine evidence against the concerned 
taxpayer.
65
 In relation to Russia, it is not clear how the exchange of tax information 
with other jurisdictions will be performed in practice since, at present, there are no 
appropriate arrangements in the Russian tax authorities’ systems.
66
 
A further appealing aspect of the new Russian-Cyprus DTA is the development of the 
institution of reciprocal assistance in tax collection (Article 27).
67
 The scope of 
assistance in the collection of taxes will be extended to allow tax authorities to verify 
the legitimacy and amount of the tax requirements of one State in the courts and 
administrative bodies of another State. The request for assistance in collection 
however, may be refused on various grounds - for example, if the requested measures 
are contrary to the domestic laws of a State. The new version of Article 27 enters into 
force as soon as the appropriate legal foundation is implemented by Cyprus.
68
 
The Russian fiscal authorities are aware that a number of Russian taxpayers use 
Cypriot companies for tax avoidance, but until now they rarely challenged DTA 
benefits on these grounds. A new provision on the limitation of benefits (Article 29) 
provides a mechanism to combat treaty shopping. Similar provisions are quite 
widespread in international tax practices.  For example, many US DTAs include a 
limitation of benefits provision, but there are only a few of its kind in the Russian 
DTA network.  The Australia-Russia DTA is one of these, containing a limitation of 
benefits clause in Article 23.  The new provision implies that a treaty benefit will not 
be granted to a resident of a Contracting State if the competent authorities of Russia 
and Cyprus establish that “the main purpose or one of the main purposes of the 
creation or existence of such resident was to obtain the benefits under this Agreement 
that would not otherwise be available”.
69
 The scope of application of this article is 
somewhat limited: it will only be applicable to companies that are registered outside 
of a contracting State. However, the provision applies to companies that establish a tax 
residency in Cyprus (that is, a company that has its place of management and control 
in Cyprus).  
                                                 
63 Zaharov A. 2009, above n 37. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Ibid. 
66 The Department of International Cooperation and Information Exchange at the Federal Tax Service of 
Russia used to deal with the exchange of information requests but as a result of restracturing of the tax 
service it was suspended. 
67 Protocol to the Russia-Cyprus DTA, above n 42. 
68 Zaharov A. 2009, above n 37. 
69 Protocol to the Russia-Cyprus DTA, above n 42. 
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Interestingly, Article 29 is not meant to apply to resident individuals. Rather, this 
provision appears to target corporate tax residents of Cyprus that were incorporated 
elsewhere and afterward acquired tax residency in Cyprus by moving their place of 
management and control. In this context it is worth noting that there is Russian case 
law dealing with non-Cypriot incorporated residents that have effectively claimed 
benefits under the DTA.
70
 These structures are considered to be offensive by the 
Russian fiscal authorities and consequently, it is logical that this provision target 
identical arrangements. 
It is also worth noting that a probable rejection of DTA benefits can only arise as a 
result of mutual agreement between Russia and Cyprus about the offensive character 
of the exploitation of tax residence in the case in question. This approach differs 
considerably from the approach taken in other Russian DTAs. For instance, the 
Russia–US DTA provides certain criteria for the availability of treaty benefits and the 
taxpayers can only apply to the fiscal authorities to confirm that these criteria are 
applicable in their particular cases. Additionally, Article 29 does not specify the 
applicability of the DTA where the fiscal authorities of Cyprus and Russia disagree in 
a certain case. A taxpayer may be deprived from the DTA benefits only if the fiscal 
authorities of both countries regard the taxpayer’s case to be offensive. Consequently, 
neither DTA party may invoke this provision unilaterally, which critically limits the 
application of Article 29. 
4.0 CONCLUSION 
Russian international tax law may be characterised as rather fractional and curtailed.  
However, the Russian tax system is in the process of reform, and recent updates in the 
rules related to tax avoidance as well as provisions preventing misuse of tax treaties 
represent a positive advancement. Unfortunately, the proposed draft regulation 
integrating the beneficial ownership concept into Russian tax law is not 
comprehensive enough to cover all the related issues. The proposed amendments will 
provide little assistance to the Russian government in combating treaty shopping and 
tax avoidance in the international arena. Clear guidelines and procedures should be set 
out instead, with comprehensive regulations specifying a mechanism and criteria for 
the beneficial ownership test. Without the introduction of such regulations, and 
imposing a legal responsibility on individuals for the reliability of disclosed 
information, international tax schemes will not be eliminated. Nonetheless, this draft 
law and other observed efforts of the Russian government represent the ongoing shift 
to the ‘substance over form’ standard in Russian domestic and international tax law. 
It is debatable that the Russian government has implemented a tougher approach to the 
applicability of the benefits available under the Russia-Cyprus DTA. The growing 
level of business activities between the two countries provides reasonable incentives 
to the Russian authorities to maximise their revenues by extensively restricting the 
scope of the DTA. However, the discussed loopholes of the protocol considerably 
weaken this restrictive power. Considering that the ratification of some of the protocol 
provisions have been delayed, the Russian fiscal authorities should clarify ambiguities 
                                                 
70 See, for example, Decision of the Ninth Circuit Arbitration Court of Appeals No. 09АП-1 269/2007-
АК of 1 October 2007. 
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found under the DTAs provisions.  This may have a profitable impact on tax revenues. 
Notwithstanding initial concerns caused by the amendments to the Russia Cyprus 
DTA, it remains one of the most beneficial Russian DTAs. On the other hand, the 
amendments clearly indicate that the Russian tax authorities are starting to focus on 
the actual business rationale behind Cypriot structures. In this sense, the protocol 
provides Russian fiscal authorities with new instruments to confront tax-driven 
business structures. 
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